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ON THE STRUCTURE OF WE BOYS, US GIRLS AND THE LIKE 
l. INTRODUCTION 
This paper examines the syntactic status of the pattern represented by such constructions 
as ~ose in italics in (1) and (2) below: 
(1) We men will stay in this position. 
(2) You girls try t<i keep out ofthe way. 
Although the pattern has received only passing attention in grammars, two proposals haye be-
come rooted in the tradition: one is the DETERMINER theory, advocated, for instance, by Postal 
(1964: 201-225), Burton-Roberts (1975: 393) and Huddleston (1984: 233 ff.), and the other is 
the APPOSITIVE theory, put forward by, among others, Delorme & Dougherty (1972), Quirk et 
al. (1985: 352) and Hernanz & Brucart (1987: 151). These two proposals will be rejected he-
re. lt will be argued that no formal account of the pattern in question can be satisfactorily at-
tained. This is because this construction type fails to conform to prototypical conditions for 
any syntactic category one may wish to associate it with. 
2. THE DETERMINER THEORY 
Already in the late sixties Postal put his claim in the following form: 
( ... ) my basic claim ( ... ) is that the so-called pronouns /, our, they, etc., are really ar-
ticles, in fact types of definite articles. However, article elements. are only introduced 
as segments in intermediate syntactic structures. In the deepest structures they are, 
(.: .), not present segmentally but are represented as syntactic features of nouns, fea-
tures analogous to Animate, Human, Countable, etc. (p. 203) 
In order to support his claim that pronouns are articles, Postal postulated that the head noun 
of the NP in which the pronouns are articles is one(s): 




Since we do not usually find such forms in everyday speech, Postal found himself compelled 
to posit a rule of Pronoun Deletion (PRO DEL) by means of which only the forms which he 
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takes as articles ( /, you, we, etc.) would surface. Actually, stripped of the generative jargon of 
the time, it is interesting to find out that Postal's dated form of argumentation is somewhat 
backed up by the existence in certain dialects of English of forms such as: 
(4) we'uns, 
you'uns 
But, apart from this, the real motivation behind Postal's and all other proponents of the deter-
miner theory is precisely the existence of forms such as we men, you girls, and so on, which 
are customarily presented as evidence that, even in standard English, so-caBed pronouns may 
behave as articles, at least in this context. Indeed, in these constructions the personal pronoun 
enters into paradigmatic contrast with the definite article and other ordinary determiners: 
(1) We men will stay in this position. 
(5) The men will stay in this position. 
(6) Sorne men will stay in this position. 
It is no wonder, then, that this determiner theory has established itself in the grammatical tra-
dition, and that passing dealings with the construction under scrutiny here have often been 
speedily resolved by invoking such a theory. 
3. THE APPOSITIVE THEORY 
The rejection of Postal's theory. 
However, there are insurmountable difficulties with this analysis. As a matter of fact, the 
distributional similarity that we observed in examples (1), (5) and (6) above can be shown to 
have little significance and, what is more important, to be easily accounted for on other 
grounds. As Delorme and Dougherty point out, the determiner theory would be simplified if 
all the constructions in (7)-(8) below were well-formed: 
(7a) *Iboy 
(7b) *yo u boy 
(7c) *he boy 
(8a) *I girl who who Billlikes. 
(8b) *you girl who Billlikes. 
(8c) *she girl who Billlikes. 
(8d) we girls who Billlikes. 
(Se) you girls who Billlikes. 
(7d) we boys. 
(7e) you boys. 
(7f) ?they boys. 
(8f) ?they girls who Billlikes. (p. 12) 
Indeed, if personal pronouns were actually definite articles, there would be no reason why all 
the (a)-(c) examples above should not be we11-formed. Their ungrammaticality can hardly be 
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referred to as "a minor, more or less morphophonemic fact", as Postal contends. The same 
can be said about cases involving the superlative construction: 
(9) * Smallest ones eat a lo t. 
(1 O) The smallest ones eat a lot. 
(11) *We smallest ones eat a lot. 
(12) We, the smallest ones, eat a lot 
and also about other cases such as (13)-(20): 
(13) *Very ones Bill saw will go. 
(14) The very ones Bill saw will go. 
(15) *We very ones Bill saw will go. 
(16) We, the very ones Bill saw, will go. 
(17) *Same ones Bill saw will go. 
(18) The same ones Bill saw will go. 
(19) *We same ones Bill saw will go. 
(20) We, the same ones Bill saw, will go. 
What Delorme and Dougherty effectively prove is that the proforms appearing in initial posi-
tion in all the constructions mentioned must be followed by whole NPs, and not just by 
nouns. This is irreconcilable with the determiner interpretation, which assumes that articles 
precede simple nouns in order to form full NPs. Note that the only instances in which the 
pattem is acceptable involve, invariably, a NP with the (null) plural, indefinite determiner (e. 
g. boys). The fact that plural indefinite NPs are realised phonetically by means of simple 
nouns seems to be what misled Postal, Burton-Roberts, Huddleston and many others into as-
suming that the constituent in initial position (we, you) acted as a determiner of such nouns. It 
is clear, however, that when the determiner must be phonetically present, that is, in the singu-
lar, its absence necessarily results in the ungrammaticality of the corresponding string (e. g. 
* 1 boy). So much then for the determiner theory. 
Deforme and Dougherty's ANP 
Delorme and Dougherty's account comprises more than a critica! review of the determiner 
theory. In order to accommodate the facts arising from their reply to Postal,! they propose the 
Appositive NP Analysis (ANP). The ANP aims to bring the constructions under review, as 
well as other similar ones, under the scope of the following phrase structure rule: 
(21) NP <-------> NP (NP) 
1 Particular! y, the fact that the element following the pronoun must be a NP. 
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(21) is specifically a rule for the formation of appositive constructions of whatever·kind. In 
fact, (21) is simply a late phrase-structure grammar reformulation of the traditional Hocket-
tian conception of apposition. If we apply it to we men, for instance, it would have the follow-








We M en 
Aside from this PM, Delorme & Dougherty never specify what their view of apposition exac-
tly is. From their comments here and there, we may gather that this view is quite vague. In the 
first place, they adrnit the inclusion as apposition of "the complements of nouns like fact, re-
ply, answer, question, etc." (p. 11), but they do not bother to explain what prompts an apposi-
tive analysis for these "complements". Thus, they also see as apposition structures such as my 
brother Bill and the word apple, which appear to be better explained in terms of ordinary de-
pendency. That is, for Delorme and Dougherty, both complements and modifiers may be ap-
positives, but we are never told when complements and modifiers are not appositives.2 In ad-
dition to this, on the basis of the semantic interpretation of the following two examples: 
(23) We men. 
(24) *We men think that we women should go. 
they postulate that constructions like we men etc. can always "have appositive meanings".3 
However, they fail to explain what kind of meanings they are talking about. All they say is 
that (24) "assert(s) that we are men and that we are women" (p. 16), a logical impossibility 
that is supposed to explain the ungrammaticality of this construction. But, is such an assertion 
meant to claim that the members of an apposition are co-referential, or that an underlying 
1 Notice, incidentally, that Delorme and Dougherty's rule yields a PM for apposition that is virtual! y identical to that 
of a coordinate phrase. 
2. Since it is unlikely that they regard apposition, modification aod complementation as one and the same thing they 
should clearly specify when, if ever, the three notions coalesce. 
3. Contrary to Postal's assertion that they do not have appositive meaoings, "at least not always" (p. 219). 
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copular relationship should be posited between them? Delorme and Dougherty do not clarify 
any of the claims they make in passing. 
This is because they are more concerned with rejecting the determiner theory and with inte-
grating constructions like we men, etc. into what they call their "natural class" of structures 
than with putting forward a tight definition of the notion of apposition. What is of importance 
to us, therefore, is to examine what they explicitly consider to be the same "natural class" of 
constructions. In their view, the paradigm resulting from the application of rule (21) above is 
the following: 
(25a) 1, the hoy, 
(25b) yo u, the hoy, 
(25c) he, the hoy, 
(26a) 1, a hoy, 
(26b) you, a hoy, 
(26c) he, a hoy, 
(25d) We, the boys, 
(25e) you, the boys, 
(25f) they, the boys, 
(26d) we, boys, 
(26e) yo u, boys, 
(26f) they, boys, 
It will be seen that in all the examples abo ve there are strong intonation breaks ( commas on 
the written page) between the two NPs. Since Delorme and Dougherty had been dealing with 
constructions without any intonation boundary, they find themselves compelled to account for 
it. They state: 
The appositive constructions with a plural indefinite article on the appositive NP (e. g. 
we menfrom the East Side, we peachpickers, etc.) may be spoken with or without a 
comma intonation separating the appositive. In this respect, they are like the apposi-
tive constructions with a definite article on the appositive NP (e. g. we the people of 
The United States want justice; we the peachpickers, being of sound mind and body, 
want a union; Bill the alcoholicforgot where he lived). (pp. 10-11) 
In other words, in Delorme and Dougherty's view, the relationship between examples like we, 
boys, and others such as we boys "provide[s] evidence that stress, intonation, pauses, etc. are 
not necessarily re_vealing in specifying underlying constituent structure or semantic 
interpretation", (p. 11). Delorme and Dougherty's account is, however, misleading in that it 
fails to take into consideration the exact nature of the differences between the instances with 
and without the pause pitch. Witness (27)-(28) below now: 
(27a) *1 the hoy 
(27b) *yo u the hoy 
(27c) *he the hoy 
(28a) *1 a hoy 
(28b) *yo u a hoy 
(28c) *he a hoy 
(27d) we the boys 
(27e) you the boys 
(27f) *they the boys 
(28d) we boys 
(28e) yo u boys 
(28f) ?they boys 
In the face of the ungrammaticality of more than sixty-six per cent of the previous restrictive 
paradigm, it is not clear how one should take Delorme and Dougherty's assertion that "stress, 
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intonation, pauses, etc. are not necessarily revealing in specifying underlying constituent 
structure or semantic interpretation" (p. 11 ). The fact is that al! twelve non-restrictive are 
good, while only four restrictive are so -the latter being the frrst and second persons in the 
plural. Note further that al! the asterisked examples involve two full NPs as members. This 
means that Delorme and Dougherty's rule (21) is not enough to "generate" the well-formed 
strings (we boys, you boys) and block the ill-formed ones (*! the boy, *he the boy). Clearly, 
~e need more than a phrase structure rule to account for the irregular distribution of the data. 
4. THE IDIOSYNCRASY OF THE PATTERN 
As a matter of fact, it is precisely the highly idiosyncratic behaviour of the first and the 
second persons in the plural that casts doubts on linguists' attempts at systematization and re-
gularization. In normal circumstances, research on the syntactic organization of language is 
carried out on the assumption that categories are a stable theoretical construct. In this way, 
one can start investigating the behaviour of, say, Prepositional Phrases, knowing that such 
phrases are incompatible with certain functions, certain positions in the sentence structure, 
and so on. The description that one gains by proceeding in this way is valid for most of the 
occurrences of the category involved (though, of course, never for all occurrences). Consider 
now the case of personal pronouns. Normally, first and second person forms designate the 
speaker and the hearer respectively. They are deicticl forms in that, in order to interpret them 
appropriately, one must always have recourse to the pragmatic situation in which the act of 
speech takes place. Unlike nouns, personal pronouns designate grammatical personae, which 
explains why, despite their lack of inherent, semantic features, they never pose problems to 
denote a proper referent. By definition, therefore, first and second person pronouns incorpora-
te, when they first appear in the context, all the referential specification of the individuals 
they denote. This is the reason why they do not usually admit further restrictive qualification 
of their reference and why, consequently, the only kind of expansion natural to them is the 
non-restrictive one.2 All this is well-known and serves as a point of reference -or, as sorne 
may say, as a prototype- for any construction involving these forms. Coming back to we boys, 
etc., the problem is that there seems to be no way of reÍating the grammar of such structures 
to the prototypical grammar of personal pronouns, since an essential property of these (viz. 
their incompatibility with restrictive expansions) is distinctly not present in such structures as 
we boys. Yet, as we have just seen, they are still personal pronouns, or at least not articles. 
l. Cf. Huddleston's words: "We say that an expression is used deictically when its interpretation is detennined in re-
lation to certain features of the utterance-act: the identity of the speaker and adressee together with the time and 
place at which it occurs. Take, for example, an utterance of: l want to know why you are he re. Clearly the referents 
of l and you are respective! y whoever is uttering the sentence and whoever is being addressed: if Tom Smith utters 
(the sentence), l refers to Tom Smith, if Sue Jones utters it, l refers to Sue Jones, and so on" (1984: 282). Third per-
son fonns are, on the contrary, nonnally only anaphoric, but not deictic. 
2. As is evident from the ungrammaticality of most of the fonns in the restrictive paradigm mentioned above. See 
Hemanz and Brucart (1987: !50 ff.) for a brief, but precise, account of the grammar of personal pronouns. For a 
more detailed account, see Bolinger (1977) and Buhler (1967: 169) (especially for their deictic function). 
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At this point, we may ask ourselves what theoretical legitimacy should be given to the pre-
sumed formal description of idiosyncratic syntactic behaviour. Since linguists must proceed 
on the basis of their knowledge of a certain category, when such a category fails to behave in 
a way approximating the expected pattem, it is clear that conclusions cannot be reached by 
reference to that expected pattem. On tJ:¡e whole, then, the a-systematic acceptability of the 
first and second plural forms of the restrictive paradigm is best seen in the context of other 
performance phenomena. There are indications that this is an area of grammar particularly 
prone to performance innovation. Consider in this respect the italicised strings in (29)-(30): 
(29) Us guys are going to the cinema. 
(30) Your father doesn't like us guys. 
It will be seen that whereas (30) is perfectly respectful with the rules of grammar, (29) is defi-
nitely atypical in the selection of the personal pionoun's case.! Yet, language users say us 
guys by the si de of we guys (though preferably the former type) in current American English. 
Another disturbing fact comes from the following set of constructions:2 
(31) Silly me! 
(32) Good old you! 
(33) We doctors. 
(34) You there. 
(35) We ofthe modem age. 
(36) Us over here. 
(37) You in the raincoat. 
where again the presence of the restrictive expansion does not bring about acceptability prob-
lems. Indeed, we could start from (31 )-(37) to refute the general belief that personal pronouns 
cannot take restrictive expansions, were it not for the fact that, except for a case such as silly 
me, it is again only the first and second persons plural that behave in this way: 
(38) *Silly they! 
(39) *He there. 
(40) *I ofthe modem age. 
(41) *They over here. 
(42) *He in the raincoat. 
In the way of an explanation, the fact that the number must be plural might initially be ac-
counted for on pragmatic grounds: one does not normally need to restrict the reference of the 
singular first or second persons since they are situationally inferred in the context. In the plu-
ral, however, one may be in need of defining which individuals are meant among a sizeable 
l. On the irregularity of the accusative case in structures such as us guys, cf. G. Kjellmer (1986: 445-449). 
2
. All of them are taken from Quirk et al. (1985: 352-3); in particular, from a section of their Grammar which they 
entitle "Modification and determination of personal pronouns". 
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number of them. This would explain why the third person plural is sometimes also acceptable 
in its objective form, as in l don't like them cops. But, then, in *they girls or, for that matter, 
*he the doctor, why can we not make use of the very same mechanism in order to select the 
individuals in question within a group? There appears to be no answer to this, that is, no for-
mal answer, for, the construction fails to conform to prototypical conditions for any syntactic 
category we may wish to associate it with. 
To recapitulate, it is important to emphasize the fact that structures such as we boys and so on 
do behave atypically within the grammar of personal pronouns. Unfortunately, one cannot 
bypass their deviant behaviour by positing either that these pronouns are articles, or that they 
are part of an ordinary NP in a traditional apposition. As we have seen, the facts argue against 
these two interpretations. The problem lies in the fact that we have not been able to ascertain 
what it is that makes these constructions acceptable only in the case of the first and second 
persons plural, and unacceptable for most of the occurrences of all the other persons. In the 
absence of solid, formal criteria, we are forced to conclude, somewhat sadly, that the pattem 
in question must remain "a piece of'' idiosyncratic syntax, a sort of mysterious island in an 
otherwise well-codified system of grammar. But this recognition is, it is hoped, better than 
formulating an intricate formal theory which after al! does not fit the facts. 
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